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International Responses to Territorial Conquest
Eugene Kontorovich

The prohibition on territorial conquest is a cornerstone of the international legal
order. The United Nations Charter bans the use or threat of force as a tool of international
relations, even when used to rectify prior injustices. The sole exception is self-defense.
Thus territory taken by force has the status of ill-gotten gains, and cannot be kept by the
victor.
An important corollary is that third-party states cannot recognize the sovereignty
of the conqueror or otherwise treat the acquisition as illegal.1 Given the stillbirth of the
U.N. collective security system, nonrecognition is one of the few realistic ways the
international community has sanctioning deterring conquerors. This much is taken as
axiomatic in international law. Indeed, the anti-conquest norm and its nonrecognition
corollary are so important that in the view of most international lawyers, even conquest
through lawful self-defense against an aggressor is forbidden.
Despite the Charter, nations sometimes acquire or try to acquire territory through
force. The standard response of international lawyers to violations of international norms
is to stress that such behavior does not prove the absence or weakness of the norm.
What’s important for assessing a norm’s vitality is the international legal community’s
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Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among
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response to violations. If nations respond to a violation of a norm by condemning it as
such, it suggests the norm is not a dead letter.
I will discuss the very preliminary and tentative findings of a project that seeks to
asses the nature of third-party reactions to territorial conquest. It examines the
international reaction every consummated conquest since the entry into force of the UN
Charter. It does not examine the incidence of aggression or even of conquest. The
question is, given a conquest, what is the expected international reaction?
While territorial conquest has been relatively infrequent in the post-World War II
period, most conquests have not been condemned by the international community.
Indeed, acceptance is as common as condemnation. While little can be said about the
deterrent effect of the anti-conquest norm, the punitive effect appears insignificant. The
small likelihood of international opposition to conquest suggests that the relatively low
incidence of conquest should be attributed to causes other than the non-recognition norm.
Several scholars have examined territorial aggression in the postwar period. The
political science literature empirically examines the correlates and causes of aggression
and successful conquest.2 This literature is mostly interested in the primary behavior, not
the legal sanction it receives. The one major project to look at international legal
reactions to conquest takes an in-depth case-study approach, examining five episodes.3
Given the relatively small number of conquests in the post-war period, systematically
looking at the legal reaction to all of them seems plausible and worthwhile. This project
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looks at questions not answered in the political science literature, and at a fuller set of
conquests than Korman.
Approaching this question involves several methodological problems. The biggest
is determining what counts as a “conquest” for purposes of this study. The existing
political science datasets focus on aggression, not conquest per se. The difference
between aggression and conquest is success. Separating conquest from aggression
requires some duration criterion. Not having such a requirement would be vastly
overinclusive: any territorial encroachment, no matter how brief, in any minor cross
border skirmish could count as conquest. On the other hand, any duration requirement
would weeding out many attempted conquests. By looking for consummated conquests,
the definition would miss abortive or rapidly defeated aggressions. For example, if one
counts conquests – as this project tentatively does – only those lasting a year or more, one
would leave out such a major episodes of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the
Argentinean seizure of the Falklands.
The central problem is that the difference between conquest and aggression are
occupation is largely one of intent, and perhaps success. This project assumes such intent
only when clearly manifested in conduct. There are several justifications for using this
stricter definition of conquest. First, defeated attempts at conquest are certainly far fewer
than the hundreds of thousands of shorter territorial encroachments that could be thought
of as “transient conquests.” Second, one may expect of international reaction to
consummated conquests would be different from attempted ones. In the latter case,
condemnation may be slow in coming as nation’s hope the victim state will deal with the
situation itself. Conquest implies a certain permanence. Conquest is regarded as worse

than the aggression, so one would expect on this ground criticism to be are more readily
evident when the permanent intention becomes clear.4
Whatever the limitations of this definition, it allows focusing on a particular
question – the international response to conquest and the vitality of the nonrecognition
norm. While attempted or pending conquest may be criticized, such denunciation may
turn out to bee short-lived in the face of a fait accompli. It is precisely for durable
conquests that the obligation on third-party states to treat conquests as illegal exists. The
focus of this inquiry is what happens when nations do conquer. It is an examination of a
penal norm. If one were to want to see how law treated murderers, it would be proper to
exclude attempted murders from the study.
The other major methodological question concerns classifying the international
response. While international reaction is a continuum, one can conveniently think of three
broad reactions to conquest: condemnation, approval, and silence or acquiescence. The
lack of any clear response by the majority of nations would suggest acquiescence, even if
particular nations took strong positions. Condemnation could be most clearly expressed
by a Security Council resolution, which appears to be what the Charter ideally
contemplates. A critical General Assembly resolution also shows broad condemnation. In
the absence of U.N. resolution clearly condemning war approving a conquest, one must
look to the actions of individual states. This route poses the most difficulties.
Depending on certain coding decisions, there have been somewhere between 12
and 18 forcible conquests by existing states after the adoption of the U.N Charter.5
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Perhaps international condemnation could effect the success of an attempted conquest -- though short of
intervention, as in Korea and Iraq, the mechanism of such an effect is obscure. In such a case, a study of
consummated conquests would be biased towards those territory-seeking aggressions of which the
international community is more tolerant.

International condemnation is found in only a few cases.6 Other conquests have won
overwhelming international acceptance; these interestingly include both conquests of
entire nations.7 The majority of conquests receive no clear international response.8
Taking the conquests at their smallest number, international condemnation is
found in less than one-quarter; and international approval is at least at common as
rejection, though acquiescence accounts for at least half the cases. Thus a country that
can successfully conquer and hold territory for a year has little likelihood of facing
international condemnation. Nor does there appear to be, at first glance, a connection
between the magnitude of the conquest and the reaction, except that very small
acquisitions will likely be met with indifference.
Notably, there has not been any successful conquests since 1975. On the other
hand, it seems the period since then has seen numerous invasions that created de fact
control of nominally independent states dependent on the conqueror.9 Such pseudoconquests do not fall within the scope of this project, and thus one can only conjecture at
whether they have increased as a result of the non-acquisition norm.
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